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Abstract 
I find non-investment graded companies’ motives for issuing convertible bonds in the 
Norwegian market by evaluating logistic regression results from a two-step security choice 
model from samples of 28 convertible bond-, 102 bond- and 229 equity issuances from 2005 to 
2011. The findings indicate that companies in the Norwegian market substitute convertibles for 
bonds if they have valuable investment opportunities at hand and are associated with risk and 
uncertainty. This paper argues that the issuers of convertible bonds substitute convertibles for 
bonds to mitigate the asset substitution problem and mitigate debt-related financing costs under 
the asymmetric information theory. I further deduce that convertibles are used as a debt-
instrument in the Norwegian market, different from the US market and more similar to the 
Western European market. Finding the issuers’ motives for issuing convertibles in Norway 
extend current academic research, and can be a fundament for investors’ when evaluating 
different convertible bond investment opportunities. 
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2 Why Do Non-Investment Grade Rated Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? 
 
1. Introduction 
The Norwegian convertible bond market was close to non-existing for a long time, but has grown 
in recent years. As figure 1 shows, the market is still much smaller than the bond and equity 
markets. Its hybrid nature makes convertibles more complex than the standard securities bonds 
and equity, demanding more from both issuers and investors. For example Seadrill Ltd. has 
raised approximately NOK 12.6bn through three offerings over the last four years - and forced 
early conversion of two of the convertibles for a total of NOK 8.8bn - to finance its rapid growth. 
Others, such as Bergen Group, apparently use it as an instrument for investors to become 
majority shareholders. However, only a limited number of companies choose this financing 
source compared to bonds. Observing the popularity of the Western European and US 
convertible bond markets I find it interesting to investigate the disparity of the Norwegian 
market.   
 
Figure 1. Overview of Issuance Volumes I 
The figure shows bond, convertible bond and equity issuance volume in NOKbn for both investment 
grade and non-investment grade rated companies, and covers the time period 01.01.2002 to 01.05.2011. 
The bond data is from SEB Enskilda, the convertible bond data is from Norsk Tillitsmann and the equity 
data is from the Oslo Stock Exchange. The bond (number not available) and 131 convertible bond 
issuances include privately and publicly held companies, and the 1 898 equity issuances include all types 
of issuances. International companies’ issuances in Norway are included. 
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This paper aims to figure out why non-investment grade rated companies choose to issue 
convertible bonds instead of high-yield
1
 bonds in the Norwegian market. I have limited the scope 
of this paper to non-investment grade rated companies because the convertible bond sample only 
consists of companies with such a rating. In the increasingly global and competitive economy 
financing choices are becoming more and more pivotal; it is interesting to identify factors 
affecting the companies’ financing decisions in the Norwegian market. Traditional US-based 
theory predicts that companies facing high agency costs or asymmetric information will 
substitute convertibles for either debt or equity, but findings from the US-market and the 
Western European market differs. I believe my findings can place Norwegian convertibles 
among previous geographical findings, and reveal new information regarding issuers’ motives 
for academics as well as potential issuers and investors. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of Issuance Volumes II 
The figure shows investment-grade and high-yield bond issuance volumes in NOKbn, and covers the time 
period 01.01.2002 to 01.05.2011. The bond data is from SEB Enskilda, and the bond issuances (number 
not available) include privately and publicly held companies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 A “high-yield bond” is a well used term for a bond issued by a non-investment grade rated company 
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To analyse non-investment grade rated companies financing choice I have used two different 
methods. The first method is the two-step security-choice model introduced by Lewis et al. 
(1999), and later used by Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009). Through this model I identify 
different factors’ significance in affecting companies’ financing choices. The factors are based 
upon the agency cost theories and the asymmetric information theories, and enables confirmation 
or rejection of the different theories. Current research on security choices in the Norwegian 
market is not comprehensive; Holba’s (2006) work on investment grade and non-investment 
grade rated bonds is probably the closest paper to mine. Several empirical studies and surveys 
have identified reasons in the US and Western European markets for all rated companies, with 
different results. I extend current research by using samples of 28 bond-, 102 convertible bond- 
and 229 equity issuances by non-investment grade rated companies in the Norwegian market. 
The second method is a quantitative survey. The survey consists of a series of multiple choice 
questions, disclosing the companies’ own motivation for issuing convertible bonds.  
    
I find the logit regression to have explanatory power for issuance of convertible bonds by non-
investment grade rated companies. The convertibles in the Norwegian market are designed as 
debt-like securities, more like the Western European convertibles than the US convertibles. I find 
companies to issue equity-like securities if they are risky and have valuable investment 
opportunities at hand, following good equity market performance and in high interest rate 
environments. Further I find companies to substitute convertibles for bonds if they are risky and 
have valuable investment opportunities at hand, but I do not find companies to substitute 
convertibles for bonds because they want to get delayed equity. The results from the survey is 
not significant due to the low number of respondents (nine), but the main findings also indicate 
support for the use of convertibles as a debt-like security in the Norwegian market. My findings 
further support that convertibles mitigate the asset substitution problem and mitigate debt related 
financing costs under the asymmetric information theory, which predicts that investors require a 
premium to invest in risky companies. However, I do not find any support for the use of 
convertibles to reduce the equity-related financing costs under the asymmetric information 
theory.   
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This paper examines companies’ financing choices regarding convertible bonds. I identify 
companies’ motives for issuing convertibles through both a two-step security model and a 
quantitative survey. The paper makes a complementary contribution to the convertible bond 
literature and is important to academic researchers who want to understand why non-investment 
grade rated companies issue convertible bonds in the Norwegian market. The findings in this 
paper can be of interest for investors already investing or considering investing in convertibles in 
the Norwegian market. By understanding why companies issue convertibles investors have a 
better fundament for evaluating different convertible bond investment opportunities. The 
findings enable investors to potentially identify good and bad investment opportunities 
 
The paper is structured with Section 2 reviewing theoretical arguments for capital structure, 
issuance of bonds, issuance of convertible bonds and empirical findings regarding both bonds 
and convertible bonds. Section 3 describes my data samples with descriptive statistics, and critics 
of the samples. Further, section 4 explains the logistic regression model and gives detailed 
descriptions of the variables. In section 5 I present the results from the security choice model and 
discuss the implications of my findings against theory and previous results. Section 6 concludes 
the paper.   
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2. Literature Review 
I use existing theories to define variables for the security choice regression model which can 
explain companies’ use of convertibles against theory. This section presents selected theoretical 
papers with respect to the use of high-yield bonds and convertibles, and a discussion related to 
why companies substitute convertibles for bonds. Further I present selected empirical findings. 
  
2.1 Capital Structure Theory 
The modern thinking on capital structure was formed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who 
argued that a company’s value is not affected by its capital structure in a perfect market – the 
capital structure irrelevance theorem. Their theorem states that with: i) no arbitrage, ii) no 
transaction costs and iii) consistent management in investment decision criteria, it does not 
matter if the company finances its operations with retained earnings, debt or equity. These are 
strict theoretical assumptions that do not hold in the real world, as shown by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). They argued that an agent in a principle-agent relationship do not always act in 
the principal’s interest, generating agency costs. In contrast to Modigliani and Miller, they 
argued that the capital structure will be based on minimizing agency costs, and that the 
management will invest accordingly. Hart and Moore (1995) further found management to 
overinvest if the amount of long-term debt was small, and under invest if the amount was large, 
supporting Jensen and Meckling’s agency costs theory.  
 
In their follow-up article Modigliani and Miller (1963) extended their theorem to take tax-shields 
into consideration. They found leverage to increase the value of the company, and laid the 
foundation for one of the two extended theories on capital structure. Based on the tax-shield 
theorem Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) introduced the trade-off theory. In the trade-off theory 
the optimal capital structure is found by optimizing the tax shield benefits against bankruptcy 
costs, where bankruptcy costs will increase with leverage. By eliminating one of Modigliani and 
Miller’s assumptions, they contradicted previous studies by arguing that the value of a company 
as a function of its leverage is not necessary concave. A contrast to this mathematical theory was 
introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984) who argued that a company will choose to issue safe 
securities before risky securities in their pecking-order theory. The riskiness is based on the 
assumptions that managers know more about the company than investors, i.e. asymmetric 
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information. A company will chose to finance investments internally with retained earnings, and 
will prefer to issue straight debt to equity if it needs external financing, because the company 
will reveal negative information about the company by issuing equity. 
 
Several empirical studies have compared the two theories. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
found the pecking-order theory to explain more than the trade-off theory in their study of 
companies’ debt/equity choices. Frank and Goyal (2002) on the other hand, found no empirical 
support for either theory. The pecking-order failed where it should hold: for small companies 
where asymmetric information is presumably a problem.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Motives for the Use of High-Yield Bonds 
When I examine companies’ motives for issuing high-yield bonds it is natural to compare the 
motives to the use of straight bank debt. This was the main substitute when the US high-yield 
market started its rapid growth - illustrated in figure 3 - in the late 1970s, and continued its 
growth after the fall of Drexel Burnham Lambert. For non-investment grade rated companies 
traditional bank debt had several shortcomings: i) it had many, and often strict, covenants 
reducing the companies’ financial flexibility, ii) it took time to negotiate terms with the bank, iii) 
due to the companies’ limited credit history and “riskiness” they were stuck with their current 
bank and a high coupon rate, and iv) bank debt did not allow enough leverage to control 
management.  
 
Gilson and Warner (1997) documented that high-yield bonds have fewer and less restrictive 
covenants. They argued that strict covenants can prevent companies from taking on net positive 
value (NPV) projects, preventing them from maintain financial flexibility. They further found 
high-yield bonds to have longer maturities than bank debt, enhancing the companies’ ability to 
finance long-lived projects. Taggart and Perry (1988) also found high-yield bonds to have fewer 
restrictive covenants than bank debt. They argued that investors are willing to accept fewer 
restrictive covenants in the presence of a liquid secondary market.  
 
As the competitive environment and the financing needs changed rapidly in the 1980s, 
companies were in need for flexible financing sources (Taggart and Perry, 1988). Taggart and 
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Figure 3. Overview of Issuance Volumes III 
The figure shows high-yield bond issuance volume in the US-market in USDbn, and covers the time 
period 1977 to 2010. The data is from Credit Suisse. The number of issuances is not available. 
 
 
Perry argued companies were attracted to high-yield bonds because high-yield bonds allowed 
them to raise larger amounts of capital faster than possible from negotiated sources such as bank 
debt. This was made possible due to investors’ appreciation of a liquid secondary market and the 
investors’ growing ability to monitor the performance of smaller companies, according to 
Jefferis (1990). The importance of the ability to raise funds quickly is underlined by the high-
yield’s popularity as financing source in leveraged buyouts (LBO) and management buyouts 
(MBO) in the 1980’s in the US market.  
 
By borrowing straight from the investors, high-yield bonds became a cheaper source of financing 
than bank debt due to increased regulatory costs for banks (Melnik and Plaut, 1990). They 
further argued that tighter regulation of banks will increase the use of high-yield, possibly 
explaining why the US high-yield market is much more developed than in other Western 
countries. Taggart and Perry (1988) also found high-yield to be cheaper than bank debt for the 
issuers, and argued it was due to investors’ willingness to achieve lower returns in exchange for 
the ability to trade the bonds in a liquid secondary market. For companies who would have to 
turn to the equity market to raise more capital, which often was the case for the non-investment 
grade rated companies, high-yield bonds was also a cheaper financing source. According to 
Molyneux (1990) equity investors require 20% return, while high-yield investors require 14% 
return. 
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Due to bank’s strict lending policies low-rated companies were not always able to utilize 
leverage fully. Joseph (1990) argued that the introduction of high-yield bonds enabled companies 
to get enough leverage to ensure the management do not overinvest, or in other ways do not 
focus enough on operations. This has been, and still is, one of the main arguments used by the 
promoters of LBOs and MBOs.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Motives for the Use of Convertible Bonds 
Several theoretical and empirical studies have covered convertible bond issuances, without being 
able to find conclusive motives for companies to issue convertible bonds. Loncarski et al. (2006) 
reviewed theory and empirical evidence and concluded: “The literature shows a large 
discrepancy between theory and practice.” However, “...there exist some findings, which are 
common to all empirical research.” Stein’s (1992) delayed equity theory has support, Green’s 
(1984) risk shifting hypothesis has some support, while Brennan and Kraus’ (1987) and Brennan 
and Schwartz’s (1988) risk estimation explanation have limited support.   
 
When Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that an agent will not always act in the interest of the 
principal, they introduced one of the main theories about companies’ motivation for issuing 
convertibles: agency costs. In some cases (leveraged companies e.g.), the management might be 
in the position of being able to increase the shareholder value at bondholders’ expense, 
something bondholders are aware of. According to Green (1984) convertibles can mitigate such 
potential conflicts by providing bondholders with a part of the equity upside, reducing the 
management’s willingness to undertake risky projects because of a reduced upside. Green built a 
model solving financing and incentive problems through a convertible bond, reducing 
distortionary incentives engendered by risky debt. However, this model does not remove all 
agency problems such as the management – shareholder problem. Isagawa (2000) looked at the 
latter risk-shifting problem, and found convertibles to control management opportunism due to 
its ability to restrict overinvestment and prevent under investment.   
 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) argued that convertibles can allow companies to finance profitable 
investments, which could not be carried out with costly straight debt. This theory builds on the 
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costs of asymmetric information in the light of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking-order theory, 
where the uncertainty about an investment’s return is great and investors require a premium. The 
option in the convertible bond offset this premium, and enables the issuer to finance its 
operations at an affordable price (i.e. coupon rate). Brennan and Schwartz (1988) further argued 
that the convertibles’ relative insensitivity to the issuers’ riskiness enables risky companies to 
raise capital at the same terms as less risky companies. They pointed out companies who would 
have to pay a high coupon on straight debt, such as companies perceived as risky, with assets 
hard to assess, or without consistent investment policies to be likely to issue convertibles. They 
also pointed out that the “cheap debt and equity at a premium” – explanation does not hold, the 
only reason investors accept a low coupon is that they are granted a valuable option. 
           
While Green (1984), Isagawa (2000), Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988) consider convertibles as substitute for straight debt, Stein (1991) and Mayers (1998) 
consider convertibles as a substitute for equity. Stein argued that informational asymmetries 
make convertibles an attractive way to raise equity through forced conversion for medium 
companies, due to high alternate costs of debt and equity: the backdoor equity theory. This builds 
on Myers and Majluf (1984), who argued that companies with high asymmetric information 
would experience high financing costs and dilution from an equity offering. Stein’s model is 
built on the issuers’ ability to call the convertible and high financial distress costs. Mayers (1998) 
model is close to Stein’s, but is based on uncertainty about future investment opportunities’ 
profitability and not asymmetric information. Convertibles can solve the sequential offering 
problem
2
 and mitigate the agency costs associated with investment opportunities, due to the 
issuer’s ability to call the convertible if the investment is profitable.  
 
2.4 Convertible Bonds as a Substitute for Bonds 
High-yield bonds and convertible bonds have several equal qualities as financing sources, which 
cannot explain the motivation to issue convertibles instead of high-yield bonds. They are both 
fast and flexible financing sources. The speed of the issuance process can be affected by the 
investor base. Highly professional investors – who are mainly the investor base for convertibles 
                                                          
2
The sequential offering problem involves an investment option with a future maturity date. To provide financing up 
front for both the initial project and the investment option sets up a overinvestment conflict 
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– like hedge funds, do often not require prospectus, shortening the process significantly. The 
flexibility is demonstrated by Gilson and Warner (1997) and Lewis et al. (1999), with regards to 
high-yield bonds and convertibles respectively. Both financing sources are also driven by liquid 
secondary markets, enabling investors to enter or exit positions quickly if required.  
 
The major difference relates to the issuer’s financing costs. Melnik and Plaut (1990) and 
Molyneux (1990) argued that high-yield bonds are cheaper than bank and equity financing 
respectively, while convertibles are cheaper in terms of coupon rate than high-yield. As 
mentioned this is due to the valuable option, in the longer run the convertible bond can turn out 
to be more expensive than high-yield due to equity dilution. Fridson (1994) argued that 
convertibles are a more appealing way to invest in risky companies than high-yield bonds in his 
paper on the US high-yield bond market, supporting Brennan and Kraus’ (1987) and Brennan 
and Schwartz’s (1988) asymmetric information theories. Bondholders will only get downside 
protection from companies with steady cash flow and recovery values if default, characteristics 
not suitable for risky companies. Thereof risky companies cannot afford high-yield, and have to 
issue convertibles. Jen et al. (1997) even claimed that some issuers of convertibles would not 
have been able to issue high-yield bonds.   
 
The financing costs can also be lower for convertibles than high-yield bonds due to uncertainty 
about managements’ actions and possible agency costs. Even though Joseph (1990) argued high-
yield bonds can control for management overinvestment, it cannot control for the management’s 
willingness to invest in risky projects like convertibles, as explained by Green (1984).  
 
Finally convertibles can be chosen as financing source instead of high-yield bonds because the 
issuer intends to force conversion and increase its equity. For highly leveraged companies high-
yield bonds can be a suitable financing source to refinance its debt, demonstrated by Gilson and 
Warner (1997). However, highly leveraged companies planning to invest in growth 
opportunities, as explained by Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998), will find convertibles more 
suitable than bonds and equity. The debt can be converted to equity and decrease the leverage 
once the investment opportunity turns out to be profitable.  
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2.5 Empirical Evidences 
Issuers’ Characteristics 
In his risk and return study of convertible bonds, Altman (1989) found high-yield convertible 
bond issuers’ default loss to be greater than high-yield bond issuers’, and called for more 
research on convertible bond issuers. Several studies have covered high-yield bonds and 
convertibles, enabling a comparison of the issuers’ characteristics. 
 
Both Fridson (1994) and Gramatovich (2010) referred to the high-yield bond issuers in the US 
market as medium to large companies. When it comes to convertible bonds Fridson (1994), Essig 
(1991) and Lewis et al. (1999) all found issuers in the US market to be small companies. 
However, the findings in Europe differ. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009), Burlacu (2000) and 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) all found issuers to be medium to large companies in Western Europe, 
France and Europe respectively, while Getz (2011) found issuers to be small companies in 
Norway. Fridson argued that the high-yield bond investors only had a downside and were more 
secured by larger, mature companies. The smaller and more risky companies attracted 
convertible investors due to the equity upside. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht argued that 
convertibles are an equity play in the US market, while European investors consider convertibles 
as an extension of the debt market.          
 
Jefferis (1990) found high-yield bond issuers to have sales growth of 9%, higher than other 
companies’ 3% sales growth. Other studies have used the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the 
value of companies’ future growth opportunities, and as a measure for riskiness due to the 
uncertainty of future growth. Convertible issuers are found to be growth companies with high 
market-to-book ratios by Brennan and Krauss (1987), Essig (1991), Getz (2011) and Lewis et al. 
(1999), who also found the convertible issuers to have significant higher market-to-book ratios 
than straight debt issuers. 
 
When looking at debt capacity Gilson and Warner (1997) found high-yield bond issuers to have 
limited debt capacity. Stein (1991), Jen et al. (1997) and Getz (2011) found the same result for 
convertible issuers, while Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) found the debt capacity to be 
similar to issuers of other securities. Lewis et al. (1999) found convertibles to have debt capacity, 
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but less than straight debt issuers. Both high-yield bond and convertible issuers are found to have 
a high asset base on their balance sheets by respectively Taggart and Perry (1988) and Getz 
(2011).  
 
Quantitative Surveys on Convertible Issuers’ Motivation 
Billingsley and Smith (1996) surveyed the US market to figure out companies’ motives for 
issuing convertibles. They found sweetened debt (35.3%) and delayed equity (37.2%) to be 
equally important according to management, but the primary influence by far was low coupon 
(48.3%). Managements further responded that straight debt is the chief alternative to convertibles 
(35.8%), and characterized themselves as undervalued (46.4%) at issuance of convertible bonds. 
 
A survey on capital budgeting, including convertibles, was conducted by Graham and Harvey 
(2001). They found financial flexibility and earnings dilution to be some key consideration when 
choosing financing. They found convertibles to be popular when the companies feel they are 
undervalued, especially among growth companies, supporting the asymmetric information 
framework. The survey only found moderate evidence that companies consider transaction costs 
and found delayed equity to be preferred to sweetened debt.  
 
While Billingsley and Smith (1996) looked at the US market, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
surveyed the European market to figure out companies motives for issuing convertibles. They 
found companies to issue debt as either delayed equity (85.7%) or sweetened debt (72.4%), but 
the reasons for issuing convertibles varied a lot. Evidence suggest that convertibles are attractive 
due to the flexible nature of the security, leaving companies with the possibility to tailor it to its 
needs, but also that convertibles are issued due to investors’ appetite for it. Evidence further 
supported straight debt as the best alternative to convertibles (70%), underlined by the 
importance of low coupon (60%).  
 
A Closer Look at the Market Makers and Investors 
Many of the rationales for companies to issue bonds are built on the liquidity of the secondary 
market. This liquidity can affect the demand, and thereof the financing terms companies can 
achieve in the market. History has shown how investment banks have been able to affect the 
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liquidity and the companies financing choices, such as in the case of high-yield bonds in the US 
market. The secondary market was “created” by Michael Milken3 from the investment bank 
Drexel Burnham Lambert (“Drexel”) in the late 1970’s. Milken foresaw the attractiveness of 
underwriting high-yield bonds (only 6% of corporate America was investment grade in 1986) for 
investment banks and established capabilities of acting as a secondary market-maker and a 
network of investors searching for higher yield (Taggart, 1988). The investors’ appetite for high-
yield made Drexel send executives to companies with high leverage and stable cash flows to 
pitch high-yield bonds (Gilson and Warner, 1997).  
 
The liquidity is, as pointed out, also affected by investors demand for securities. The high-yield 
bond investors are primarily institutional investors, holding 80-90% of outstanding high-yield 
bonds according to Taggart (1988). The investors have been attracted by the high yield and the 
liquid secondary market, enabling them to enter and exit positions. The convertible bond investor 
base varies more according to Bancel and Mittoo (2004). They found institutional investors to be 
the largest investor, followed by hedge funds. Norwegian investment bankers also mention an 
additional type of investors in Norway: private investors gambling on equity conversion in risky 
issuances while enjoying high-yield. The convertibles investors, except the private investors, are 
highly professional investors, who require a certain offering size and a liquid stock.  
 
The institutional investors are long in the security, and achieve stock exposure with downside 
protection. Hedge funds on the other hand delta-hedge the stock exposure by going short in the 
underlying stock, and make money on the volatility. This strategy depends on a liquid stock and 
availability of stock borrowing, and is executed by neutralizing the position when the stock price 
fluctuates. According to Bancel and Mittoo (2004), the demand for convertible bonds has been as 
important as the supply of convertible bonds in contributing to the growth of the convertible 
bond market in Europe. The demand has also affected the financing terms in convertible 
offerings, such as the Ship Finance convertible bond issuance in February 2011. High demand 
resulted in a pricing where Ship Finance achieved the lowest coupon rate and highest conversion 
premium from the indicated intervals, the most favourable terms they could achieve. 
                                                          
3
 Michael Milken pled guilty to six securities violation during an insider trading investigation in 1990, and was 
sentenced to ten years in prison 
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Risk and Return: a Comparison of High-Yield and Convertible Bonds 
A high demand for a security should indicate that the security delivered superior return compared 
to other securities, when adjusting for risk. Over the last decades high-yield bonds have proven 
to be good investments for investors trailing excess return. Altman (1998) found high-yield 
bonds’ total return to outperform Ten-Year US Treasuries for the period 1978-1997 with 226 
basis points, defaults taken into calculation. Gramatovich (2010) found similar results for the 
period 1987-2009 where high-yield bonds’ return outperformed Five-Year US Treasuries with 
600 basis points, defaults not taken into consideration. A possible reason for the spread disparity 
is the financial turmoil in 1990, 2002 and 2008 where the spreads reached extremely high 
levels
4
. Convertibles are on the other hand outperformed by both US Treasuries and high-yield 
bonds according to Altman (1989), but outperforming the NYSE Index.  
 
Table 1. Risk and Reward Studies of the US Market 
Altman used arithmetic annual mean total return and Ten-year US Treasuries in both his studies. The 
1989 study only covered the period 1980-1987 (except return which covered 1983-1987), while the 1998 
study covered 1978-1997. Gramatovich used Five-year US Treasuries and covered the period 1977-2010 
(except return, which covered 1987-2009). 
 Altman (1989) Altman (1998) Gramatovich (2010) 
Security Return 
Default 
rate 
Recovery 
rate Return 
Default 
rate 
Recovery 
rate Return 
Default 
rate 
Recovery 
rate 
US 
Treasuries 
14.0%   10.1%      
Bonds  0.32% 43%       
High-Yield 
Bonds 
14.7% 2.15%  12.4% 2.85% 43%  3.27% 42% 
Convertible 
Bonds 
13.5% 1.24% 36%       
High-Yield 
Convertible 
Bonds 
 3.09%        
NYSE 
Index 
11.7%         
 
  
                                                          
4
 70% of the time the spread was below 600 basis points 
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These findings do not support the previously discussed pecking order theory. According to the 
pecking order theory companies will choose to issue safe before risky securities, because 
investors will require higher returns to cover the additional risk. A low return for convertibles 
indicates that fewer bonds than investors expected were converted. That means issuers might 
have utilized a window of opportunity to issue a convertible bond with lower coupon than a 
straight bond, because they did not anticipate a conversion with equity dilution.    
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Figure 4. Overview of Convertible Theories with Related Empirical- and Survey Research  
Key findings underlining the support from the empirical research are listed below each paper.   
Theories and 
main 
contribution 
  Survey support 
Papers Empirical support 
B&S 
(1996) 
G&H 
(2001) 
B&M 
(2004) 
Agency costs      
Mitigate the 
asset 
substitution
5
 
problem 
Green 
(1984) 
+ Lewis et al. (1999) 
Convertibles issuers have higher MTB 
ratios, lower CF, higher volatility, higher 
leverage and are smaller than debt issuers 
+ Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
Convertible issuers have higher volatility 
and market-to-book ratio, and is smaller 
than debt issuers 
- - - 
Mitigate the 
overinvestment 
problem 
Mayers 
(1998) 
+ Mayers (1998) 
Increased investment activities at the time 
of calls of convertibles 
+ Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
Convertible issuers have higher volatility 
and market-to-book ratio, and is smaller 
than debt issuers 
 + + 
Asymmetric 
information 
     
Mitigate 
investment 
inefficiencies 
Brennan 
and 
Kraus 
(1987) 
+ Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
Convertible issuers have higher volatility 
and market-to-book ratio, and is smaller 
than debt issuers 
 + o 
Mitigate risk 
uncertainty 
Brennan 
and 
Schwart
z (1988) 
+ Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
Convertible issuers have higher volatility 
and market-to-book ratio, and is smaller 
than debt issuers 
 + o 
Mitigate 
asymmetric 
information 
Stein 
(1992) 
+ Lewis et al. (1999) 
Higher adverse selection costs (more slack, 
higher risk and high stock runup) for 
convertible- than equity issuers 
- Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
Convertible- do not have higher equity-
related financing costs than equity issuers 
- + + 
+ Support 
- No support 
o Mixed support 
                                                          
5
 The “assets substitution problem” is sometimes referred to as the “risk-shifting hypothesis” 
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3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The data for my study are obtained from several sources. The bond and convertible bond samples 
are collected from Norsk Tillitsmann. Norsk Tillitsmann is a financial-agreement trustee 
provider in the Norwegian financial market, and covers bonds of interest for – not originated in – 
the Norwegian market. For example convertible bonds issued by Petrominerales are handled by 
Norsk Tillitsmann, due to the Norwegian investment bank ABG Sundal Collier’s role as 
financial advisor to Petrominerales. The convertibles’ announcement date, conversion price and 
conversion premium are collected from NewsWeb and press releases from the companies’ 
website. The equity issuance sample is collected from Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) and consists 
of equity issuances by companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index (OSEAX). 
 
All financial company data is collected from Factset, a provider of financial information and 
analytic software for investment professionals. The financials are Reuters Historical Financials, 
and recognized for being accurate by leading investment banks. The data samples are modified 
by elimination of outliers clearly influencing the results negatively; including equalizing 
financials close to zero to zero. The samples do only include non-investment grade rated 
companies. Credit ratings are obtained from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and shadow 
ratings on companies not covered by the mentioned agencies are obtained from Norwegian 
investment banks. Companies without rating or shadow rating are expected to be non-investment 
grade. 
      
3.1 The Convertible Bond Data Sample 
The original data sample has a population of 94 convertible bonds from 2005 to 11.02.2011. First 
I exclude utilities and banking companies due to the industries’ heavily regulated nature. To be 
included in the final sample, observations must further be non-investment grade rated publicly 
traded companies today, have available financial data from Factset and available security-related 
data (e.g. conversion premium) at NewsWeb. After applying these filters the sample is reduced 
to 28 convertible bond issuances of a total of NOK 35.9bn offered by 21 companies. The 
reduction of observations limits the significance of my results, but only to an extent as the final 
data sample represent 67.9% of the original data sample measured by volume.   
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3.2 The Bond Data Sample 
The original data sample has a population of 1527 bonds from 2005 to 11.02.2011. This is 
excluded government and municipality bonds due to their ownership. Further I exclude bonds 
issued by utility and banking companies. Finally the issuers have to be non-investment grade 
rated publicly traded companies on OSEAX, have available financial data from Factset and 
issuances larger than NOK 50m. This reduces the final sample to 102 bond issuances of a total of 
NOK 48.9bn offered by 43 companies. 
 
3.3 The Equity Data Sample 
The original data sample has a population of 836 equity issuances from 2005 to 30.09.2010. 
IPOs and Employment Placements are excluded because they are carried out under different 
circumstances and other terms than regular right issues. Further I have excluded non-investment 
grade rated companies, utility and banking companies, companies no longer listed on OSEAX, 
issuers without available financial data from Factset and issuances smaller than NOK 50m. The 
final sample consists of 229 equity issuances of a total of NOK 102.0bn offered by 80 
companies. 
 
Table 2. Overview of the Data Samples I 
Composition of the data samples by year, number of issuers and number of issuances.  
 Bonds Convertible Bonds Equity 
Year Companies Issuances Companies Issuances Companies Issuances 
2005 3 6   17 27 
2006 14 18 3 3 26 47 
2007 14 16 7 7 39 53 
2008 4 9 1 1 19 25 
2009 20 26 9 9 36 51 
2010 17 26 6 6 20 26 
2011 1 1 2 2   
Total 43 102 21 28 80 229 
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Table 3. Overview of the Data Samples II 
Composition of the data samples by industries. The industries cover for 81%, 86% and 79% by number of 
issuances respectively, out of 102, 28 and 229 observations. Size is measured in Total Assets. 
 Bonds Convertible Bonds Equity 
Industry # Mean size 
Mean 
issuance # Mean size 
Mean 
issuance # Mean size 
Mean 
issuance 
Oil Well 
Services & 
Equipment 
35  19 378   612  12  22 368   1 740  68  10 163   671  
Oil & Gas 
Operations 
23  10 233   444  5  6 067   1 543  42  3 688   263  
Water 
transportation 
18  12 875   386  4  11 523   825  24  6 990   517  
Food 
Processing 
3  5 566   367  3  8 220   659  17  5 279   887  
Software & 
Programming 
      13  301   116  
Construction 
Services 
      10  2 153   189  
Gold & 
Silver 
4  13 802   207     7  2 446   346  
Total 102 12 365 479 28 14 422 1 282 229 6 184 524 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, 3 and 4 present some descriptive statistics for the data samples. Table 2 shows that the 
activity in the convertible bond market has been, and is, limited compared to the bond and equity 
markets. The trend is however positive and the average issuance size returned to the high levels 
of 2007 in 2010, with NOK 1 731m. This is higher than both the straight bond and equity 
market, with NOK 487m and NOK 652m respectively. Table 3 shows that the oil-industry 
represents the majority of issuances within all securities, followed by the shipping industry. The 
oil-industry accounts for 64.7% of the bonds, 79.7% of the convertible bonds and 47.2% of the 
equity issuances by issuance volume. This is understandable, due to OSE’s high “oil-factor”. The 
oil-industry consists of the largest companies, and has the largest issuances on average.      
 
Table 4 shows that the convertible bond issuers are larger than the ones of straight bonds and 
equity in terms of market capitalization. The equity issuers are also the least profitable, with the 
convertible bond issuers being the most profitable measure by both EBITDA margin and ROA. 
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The bond issuers’ revenues are higher than the convertible issuers, while the convertible issuers’ 
market capitalization is twice the size. This indicates that the bond issuers are more mature 
companies, while the convertible issuers have growth opportunities at hand.  
 
Table 4. Overview of the Data Samples III 
The table shows selected financial data for the samples, 102, 28 and 229 observations respectively. All 
numbers in NOKm. 
 Bonds Convertible Bonds Equity 
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Revenues   5 778   1 320      5 012      2 781   2 108   762  
Market capitalization   6 356   3 325   14 107     10 177   4 183   1 630  
EBITDA margin   14.7%   12.9%  20.8%       19.3%   11.8%  11.7%  
ROA   -0.5%  1.1%  -0.1%        2.7 %  -1.0%  0.4% 
 
Sample characteristics are presented in table 5, with significance test results presented in table 6. 
The amount issued in convertible bond offerings is significantly larger than both straight bonds 
and equity offerings. Of the convertible bond offerings the debt-like convertibles are the largest. 
In terms of proportion of market capitalization issued, the equity issuances are significantly 
larger than convertibles, which are also significantly larger than the bonds issuances. The 
convertible and bond issuers have the same dividend yield, higher than the equity issuers.   
 
The stock runup shows large disparity between mean and median, indicating large variances 
within the different samples, and i do not find any significant differences. The bond issuers have 
the same financial slack as the equity issuers, both significantly larger than the convertible 
issuers. Leverage is fairly similar, with bond issuances being significantly more leveraged than 
the convertible issuers. All samples have negative cash flow on average, with convertible issuers 
and bond issuers being significantly more profitable than the equity issuers. The equity issuers 
are significantly more volatile than the bond issuers, but have similar volatility as the convertible 
issuers. Bond issuers do not pay more taxes than equity issuers, but the convertible bond issuers 
pay significantly more taxes than both bond- and equity issuers.  
 
As expected the convertible issuers’ market-to-book ratio is significantly greater than the bond 
issuers, but the equity issuers have the same ratio as the convertible issuers. The typical issuer of 
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convertible bonds is the same size as the bond issuers in terms of total assets, and significantly 
larger than equity issuers. 
 
3.5 Critics of the Data Samples 
The major critique against the samples is the small amount of convertible bonds. 28 observations 
might not give an accurate description of the average issuer, and the large spread between mean 
and median in company characteristics underlines this. The 28 observations are much fewer than 
both Lewis et al. (1999) with 203 convertible offerings
6
 and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) 
with 179 convertible offerings
7
. To increase the number of observations I could have extended 
the time period beyond 2005, but due to the market’s development I find the issuances in recent 
times to be most appropriate for my study. In additional, 92.3% of the convertibles issuances 
since 2000 - by volume - have been issued since 2005. With development I refer to investor 
demand and secondary market liquidity. In addition we have experienced a broad range of 
economic conditions in the time period, from high growth in 2006 to recession in 2008 and 
uncertain positivity in 2010. This makes the sample more robust. When evaluating sources Norsk 
Tillitsmann should be covering all convertibles in the Norwegian market, but there might be 
convertibles not covered by their statistics and therefore not included in this paper. 
 
I present both mean and median to illustrate the large disparity within the data samples. While 
the mean shows the actual average, the median on the other hand correct for outliers and present 
the value in the middle. In addition the median is better in describing samples with few 
observations than the mean. Even though the convertible bond sample consists of few 
observations I prefer to evaluate the mean numbers, because I find the outliers to be of interest 
for the characteristics.     
  
                                                          
6
 From 1977 to 1984 
7
 From 1994 to 2004 
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4. Methodology 
My study is based on the work of Lewis et al. (1999). By using a two-step security choice model 
including logistic regression Lewis et al. predicted what type of security a company is expected 
to use in the US market. Later Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (200) used the same model with 
some additional variables in the Western European market. In addition I have conducted a 
qualitative survey among the companies in my convertible bond sample. The survey is based on 
the surveys of Billingsley and Smith (1996) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004), investigating issuers’ 
motives for issuing convertibles. However, the results from the survey were not significant due 
to a low number of respondents (nine). The survey will be attached in Appendix F. 
  
4.1 Research Design 
I model convertible debt issuance decision of companies in the Norwegian market with the two-
step security choice model presented by Lewis et al. (1999). The model includes convertible 
bonds, bonds and common equity issuances, because managers choose to issue convertible bonds 
over the other standard financing securities. In the first step the companies choose to issue a 
debt-like security or equity-like security, while in the second step the companies choose within 
each security group to issue convertibles over bonds or equity. 
 
The first-step analysis consists of a logistic regression model with the dependent variable being 
continuous on the interval [0, 1]. The dependent variable, DEP, is the probability of conversion 
of the security to equity at maturity; bonds will get the value 0, equity will get 1 and convertible 
bonds will get the risk-neutralized probability of conversion. The probability is calculated with 
N(d2) where N() is the cumulative probability under a standard distribution function, based on 
Black-Scholes assumptions. Thereof, d2 is determined as follow: 
   
  
 
 
      
  
 
  
   
   (1) 
In equation (1) S is stock price at announcement, X is the original conversion price; r is the 
continuously compounded yield on a 5-year Norwegian Government Bond at issuance;   is the 
dividend yield for the fiscal year-end preceding announcement;   is the standard deviation of the 
equity return calculated over the period 240 to 40 days prior to issuance; and T is maturity at 
issuance in years.  
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In certain circumstances the conversion price is adjusted if the issuer pay dividend to the 
shareholders. In those occasions the dividends yield should be excluded from equation 1. By 
excluding the dividend yield the probability for conversion will increase making the convertible 
more equity-like. I have chosen to keep the original equation as used by Lewis et al. (1999) and 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009), however this might make the convertible sample’s 
dependable variables more debt-like than they are in reality.  
 
In the second-step analysis however, the dependable variable is a binary variable. Within the 
debt-like security group the debt-like convertibles are given the value 1, while in the equity-like 
security group the equity-like convertibles are given the value 0. 
 
I find the mean (median) probability of conversion in my sample to be 24.1 (24.1)%. The results 
are lower than the mean (median) probability of 28.0 (27.2)% in Western Europe found by 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) and substantially lower than the median probability of 
50.0% in the US market found by Lewis et al. (1999). This indicates that convertibles in the 
Norwegian market are structured very debt-like. This is similar to Western Europe where the 
convertible offerings are debt-like, and unlike the US market where they are equity-like. 
 
Lewis et al. (1999) argued that their model offered several advantages over traditional 
approaches. They treated the issuance choice as a financing problem where the managers are not 
restricted to sole debt or equity issuances, but can choose a security consisting of both debt and 
equity components. This enabled Lewis et al. to recognize that subsets of issuers offer 
convertible debt for different reasons in their empirical tests, providing insights to managerial 
motivations for issuing this sophisticated financing security. This is a necessary approach 
looking at theory, because the use of convertibles either as delayed equity or cheap debt is 
connected to the issuers’ motives. 
 
The second step examines the determinants of financing choice within the debt-type (debt-like 
convertibles and bonds) and equity type (equity-type convertibles and equity) security group. 
The variables are the same as in the first-step analysis. While Lewis et al. (1999) categorized 
convertible offerings with probability of conversion lower than 50% as debt, Dutordoir and Van 
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de Gucht (2009) used a probability lower than the upper quartile (32.9%) due to the Western 
European convertibles more debt-like nature. Based on the debt-like nature of the Norwegian 
market, I choose to categorize based on the upper quartile (28.9%) and identifies 21 debt-like 
and 7 equity-like convertibles.  
 
4.2 Logistic Regression  
Since the dependable variable is a continuous variable on the interval [0, 1] in the first step and a 
binary variable in the second step it is common to apply a logistic regression (“logit”). In 
problems where the outcomes are restricted, such as here, traditional Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression does not make sense. The major problem with the OLS is that the value can be 
bigger than 1 and less than 0. Following is an introduction to the logit model (Wooldridge, 
2006). 
 
Consider an OLS model on the form: 
0 1i i iY x        (2) 
By assuming the dependent variable is the probability of an event, we can assume we have a 
problem on the form: 
0 1Pr( )i i ix x        (3) 
We further assume that the probability remains within the boundaries [0, 1], represented 
algebraically for some variable z by: 
Pr( )
1
z
z
e
z
e

     (4)
 
We get the logit model by using the inverse probability and taking the natural logarithm of 
equitation 4, and assuming that z is a linear function of x: 
0 1
Pr( )
ln
1 Pr( )
i
i i
i
x
x
x
  
 
   
   (5)
 
The parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood methods, assumed to have a 
standard logistic distribution with mean of 0 and variance of 1.  
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4.3 Econometric Model 
The following logit equations are used in the regression analysis to find the relationship between 
a set of variables and the security choice: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
( 1) (
)
i i i i i i
i i i i i
P DEP L EXRET SLACK LEV PROF VOL
TAX MTB PROC MKRET YIELD
     
    
      
    
  (6) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
( 1) (
ln )
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
P DEP L EXRET SLACK LEV PROF VOL
TAX MTB PROC MKRET YIELD SIZE
     
     
      
     
  (7) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 12
( 1) (
)
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
P DEP L EXRET SLACK LEV PROF VOL
TAX MTB PROC MKRET YIELD SIZE
     
     
      
     
  (8) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 13
( 1) (
)
i i i i i i
i i i i i
P DEP L EXRET SLACK LEV PROF VOL
TAX MTB PROC MKRET BNP
     
    
      
    
  (9)  
 
In the model above, P represents the probability for the convertible to be converted to equity and 
L represents the logit regression model. Equation 6 is the basic equation of the security choice 
model. In equation 7 and 8 I include the variables lnSIZE and SIZE respectively. Equation 9 is 
similar to equation 6, except I replace the YIELD variable with the BNP variable. The 4 different 
equations are all used within the 3 different regressions. 
 
4.4 Explanatory Variables 
I have used the same explanatory variables as Lewis et al. (1999). All variables are calculated at 
fiscal year-end preceding issuance date. 
 
Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information increases the cost of external financing according to Myers and Majluf 
(1984). Companies are hence more likely to issue equity after large stock price increases, when 
the equity-related adverse selection costs are small according to Lucas and McDonald (1990). 
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Stock performance, EXRET, is calculated as excess returns over the 12 months prior to issuance. 
Lewis et al. (1999) further argued good economic conditions precede good investment projects, 
reducing the chances for moral hazard and increasing the probability of an equity issuance. I use 
12 months forward looking GDP projections, BNP, from Statistics Norway as a proxy for 
economic conditions. Once each quarter they publish a report with annual GDP projections, and I 
weight the projections according to number of quarters left in current year and number of 
quarters necessary from next year at issuance.  
 
Lewis et al. (1999) used financial slack, issue size and issuer’s size as adverse selection costs. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argued financial slack increases adverse selection costs due to fear of 
overvaluation, reducing the attractiveness of an equity issuance. The financial slack, SLACK, is 
calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Krasker (1986) argued that 
potential wealth loss for current shareholders increase with offering size, increasing adverse 
selection costs and reducing probability of equity offerings. Issuance size, PROC, is calculated as 
proceeds divided by market capitalization. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) assumed informational 
asymmetries to be negative correlated with firm size, reducing the probability of large companies 
to issue equity. Issuer size is calculated by both total assets (SIZE) and the natural logarithm of 
total assets (lnSIZE).  
 
Financial risk 
Increased financial risk increases the expected costs of financial distress. Brennan and Kraus 
(1987) argued companies with high financial distress costs would benefit from issuing 
convertibles to bonds due to the reduced coupon rate. Stein (1992) also argued forced conversion 
of convertibles to be a cheap way to get equity. Several variables are used to measure financial 
risk. The first is the leverage ratio, LEV, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Highly leveraged companies have higher financial distress costs due to the asset substitution risk. 
Next I calculate the ability to handle short-term debt. Low profitability, PROF, measured as cash 
flow divided by total assets, also increases financial distress costs. The last variable is the stock 
return volatility, VOL, calculated from 240 days to 40 days prior to issuance. High volatility 
increase asset substitution risk and hence financial distress costs. High leverage, low profitability 
and high volatility all reduce the probability of a debt offering.   
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Tax considerations 
Due to the tax-deductibility of interest payments, a company’s tax status can affect a company’s 
financing choice. The benefits of adding more debt or converting debt to equity are decided 
based on tax paid divided on total assets. High tax paid, TAX, increases the probability of a debt 
offering and is measured as tax payable divided by total assets. 
 
Growth opportunities 
The market-to-book ratio, MTB, is often used as a proxy of the value of a company’s future 
investment opportunities. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argued that growth opportunities 
increased both the risk of the company and the asymmetric information, increasing both bond 
and equity related financing costs. The market-to-book ratio is calculated as market 
capitalization plus total assets minus book value of equity divided by total assets, and a high ratio 
increase the probability of an equity offering.  
 
4.5 Control Variables 
To control for temporal market fluctuations I have included control variables, based on Dutordoir 
and Van de Gucht (2009).  
 
Financing costs 
To control for the economy-wide level of debt-related financing costs I use the 5-year Norwegian 
Government Bond yield, YIELD, measured at issuance. A high yield indicates high debt-related 
financing costs influencing companies’ ability to handle their different financing options, 
increasing the attractiveness of an equity issue. Choe et al. (1993) argued that adverse selection 
costs are reduced after a period with high market return, MKRET, on equities increasing the 
probability of an equity offering, hence the 3 months equity market return on the Oslo 
Benchmark Index (OBX) preceding issuance is used to control economy-wide equity-related 
financing costs. 
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Figure 5. Convertible Bond Hypothesis and Explanatory Variables. 
Overview of variables with expected sign in the regression analysis according to theory. The sign is based 
on increased size of the variable, and a negative sign indicates the variable increase probability for a debt-
like security while a positive sign indicates the variable increases the probability of an equity-like 
security. E indicates that the variable is an equity-related financing cost, while D indicates that the 
variable is a debt-related financing cost. 
 
Hypothesis Variables/Proxy Name Exp sign Cost 
Adverse selection costs Excess returns 12 months prior 
to announcement 
EXRET + E 
Moral hazard 12 next months Norwegian 
BNP projections 
BNP + D/E 
Adverse selection costs Financial slack 
Cash/Total assets 
SLACK - E 
Adverse selection costs Issuance size 
Proceeds/ Market cap 
PROC - E 
Adverse selection costs Company size 
Total assets 
SIZE - D/E 
 Ln(Total assets) lnSIZE  D/E 
Financial risk Financial distress costs 
Long-term debt/Total assets 
LEV + D 
Financial risk Current profitability 
Cash flow/Total assets 
PROF - D 
Financial risk Stock return volatility 
240-40 days prior to 
announcement 
VOL + D 
Capital structure Tax deductibility 
Tax payable/Total assets 
TAX - D 
Investment opportunities Market-to-book ratio 
(Market cap + Total assets - 
Book value equity)/Total assets 
MTB + D/E 
Financing cost Market return 
Market returns last 3 months 
MKRET + E 
Financing cost Financial cost 
5 years Norwegian 
Government Bond yields 
YIELD + D 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
32 
T
a
b
le
 7
. 
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
tr
ix
 
T
h
e 
m
at
ri
x
 s
h
o
w
s 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 l
ar
g
er
 t
h
an
 0
.4
0
0
 i
n
 b
o
ld
. 
T
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
ab
le
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 t
ak
es
 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
1
 f
o
r 
eq
u
it
y
 i
ss
u
an
ce
s,
 0
 f
o
r 
b
o
n
d
 i
ss
u
an
ce
s 
an
d
 a
 v
al
u
e 
eq
u
al
 t
o
 t
h
e 
ri
sk
-n
eu
tr
al
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
co
n
v
er
ti
b
le
 d
eb
t 
is
 c
o
n
v
er
te
d
 i
n
to
 e
q
u
it
y
 f
o
r 
co
n
v
er
ti
b
le
 b
o
n
d
s.
 E
X
R
E
T
 i
s 
th
e 
is
su
er
 e
x
ce
ss
 r
et
u
rn
 o
v
er
 t
h
e 
O
sl
o
 S
to
ck
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 I
n
d
ex
 (
O
B
X
) 
1
2
 m
o
n
th
s 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 i
ss
u
an
ce
. 
S
L
A
C
K
 i
s 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f 
ca
sh
 a
n
d
 c
as
h
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
ts
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
L
E
V
 i
s 
lo
n
g
 t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
P
R
O
F
 i
s 
o
p
er
at
in
g
 c
as
h
 f
lo
w
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
V
O
L
 
d
en
o
te
s 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 a
n
n
u
al
 v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
st
o
ck
 r
et
u
rn
 e
st
im
at
ed
 o
v
er
 t
ra
d
in
g
 d
ay
s 
-2
4
0
 t
o
 -
4
0
 d
ay
s 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 i
ss
u
an
ce
. 
T
A
X
 i
s 
ta
x
 p
ay
ab
le
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
M
T
B
 i
s 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
(m
ar
k
et
 c
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 +
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 -
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
) 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
P
R
O
C
 i
s 
p
ro
ce
ed
s 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 m
ar
k
et
 
ca
p
it
al
iz
at
io
n
. 
M
K
R
E
T
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
f 
th
e 
O
B
X
 3
 m
o
n
th
s 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 i
ss
u
an
ce
. 
Y
IE
L
D
 i
s 
th
e 
y
ie
ld
 o
f 
5
-Y
ea
r 
N
o
rw
eg
ia
n
 G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
B
o
n
d
s.
 S
IZ
E
 a
n
d
 l
n
S
IZ
E
 i
s 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 a
n
d
 i
ts
 n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
. 
B
N
P
 i
s 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
ex
t 
1
2
 m
o
n
th
s 
B
N
P
 p
ro
je
ct
io
n
s,
 w
ei
g
h
te
d
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
q
u
ar
te
rs
 l
ef
t 
o
f 
cu
rr
en
t 
y
ea
r 
an
d
 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 q
u
ar
te
rs
 o
f 
n
ex
t 
y
ea
r’
s 
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
. 
  
  
 
D
E
P
 
E
X
R
E
T
 
S
L
A
C
K
 
L
E
V
 
P
R
O
F
 
V
O
L
 
T
A
X
 
M
T
B
 
P
R
O
C
 
M
K
T
R
E
T
 
Y
IE
L
D
 
ln
S
IZ
E
 
S
IZ
E
 
B
N
P
 
D
E
P
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
X
R
E
T
 
0
.0
4
6
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
L
A
C
K
 
0
.0
1
5
 
0
.2
2
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
E
V
 
-0
.0
4
7
 
-0
.0
6
9
 
-0
.3
2
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
R
O
F
 
-0
.1
1
3
 
-0
.0
6
4
 
-0
.1
9
5
 
-0
.0
7
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
O
L
 
0
.0
5
3
 
-0
.0
5
7
 
-0
.2
1
6
 
-0
.1
7
4
 
-0
.0
7
9
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A
X
 
-0
.0
1
8
 
0
.0
3
0
 
0
.0
6
7
 
-0
.0
9
3
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
-0
.0
5
3
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
T
B
 
0
.1
4
7
 
0
.5
9
3
 
0
.3
8
8
 
-0
.3
0
7
 
-0
.3
1
5
 
-0
.0
8
0
 
0
.0
3
8
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
R
O
C
 
0
.1
9
8
 
-0
.1
6
3
 
-0
.0
2
9
 
-0
.0
9
6
 
-0
.0
0
5
 
0
.2
8
5
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
-0
.1
1
8
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
K
T
R
E
T
 
0
.0
6
6
 
0
.0
7
4
 
-0
.0
3
2
 
0
.0
1
6
 
-0
.0
0
6
 
0
.0
1
3
 
-0
.0
8
5
 
0
.0
7
4
 
-0
.2
0
6
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
Y
IE
L
D
 
0
.1
7
4
 
0
.0
1
6
 
0
.1
5
7
 
0
.0
6
3
 
-0
.0
6
3
 
-0
.3
4
2
 
0
.0
5
8
 
0
.1
0
3
 
-0
.1
4
9
 
-0
.0
4
5
 
1
 
 
 
 
ln
S
IZ
E
 
-0
.2
9
2
 
-0
.1
9
1
 
-0
.4
7
8
 
0
.4
8
9
 
0
.2
8
9
 
-0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
1
3
 
-0
.4
6
6
 
-0
.1
0
6
 
0
.1
0
0
 
-0
.1
2
3
 
1
 
 
 
S
IZ
E
 
-0
.2
2
6
 
-0
.1
1
2
 
-0
.2
1
3
 
0
.2
5
4
 
0
.1
7
7
 
-0
.0
4
5
 
0
.0
2
1
 
-0
.2
2
3
 
-0
.1
2
0
 
0
.1
2
8
 
-0
.1
4
9
 
0
.7
4
9
 
1
 
 
B
N
P
 
0
.1
0
6
 
0
.2
0
6
 
0
.2
0
6
 
-0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
4
1
 
-0
.5
9
3
 
0
.1
1
5
 
0
.2
9
6
 
-0
.2
2
2
 
-0
.0
9
1
 
0
.5
9
4
 
-0
.2
9
4
 
-0
.1
8
5
 
1
 
J. H. Getz (2011)          33 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix shows that the dependable variable is positively correlated to EXRET, 
BNP, SLACK, PROC, VOL, MTB, MKRET and YIELD, and negatively correlated to LEV, 
PROF, TAX, SIZE and lnSIZE. The signs of the variables SLACK, PROC and LEV are all 
opposite of the expected.  
 
There are several strong intercorrelations between variables. The BNP and YIELD variables are 
as expected positively correlated, indicating that the YIELD increases when the future economic 
conditions are good. To avoid biasness I check the variables separately in the regression. The 
SIZE and lnSIZE are linear to each others, shown with the high correlation, and the variables are 
also used separately in the regressions. The strong positive correlation between MTB and 
EXRET indicates growth companies outperform the more mature companies on OSE, but I do 
not find it necessary to check for the variables separately.  
 
lnSIZE is highly correlated to SLACK, LEV and MTB. The correlation with LEV (positive) and 
MTB (negative) is natural, because large companies tend to be more leveraged and have less 
growth opportunities present. SLACK is negatively correlated to lnSIZE, also natural because 
companies do not need to hold the same amount of total assets available when they grow larger. 
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5. Results 
Overall I find the results from the regression analysis and the descriptive statistics to confirm that 
companies use convertibles to mitigate the asset substitution problem, and risk and uncertainty 
under the asymmetric information theory. The results indicate that the convertible issuers face 
high debt-related and equity-related financing costs, making a standard security choice 
unattractive due to unattractive financing terms. However, I do not find any support for the 
backdoor equity theory.  
 
5.1 The Convertible Bond Survey 
My survey among convertible bond issuers got nine respondents, out of 21 contacted issuers. The 
low number of respondents denies me the opportunity to conduct statistical evaluation of the 
answers, but I am able to discover certain trends. 66% consider cheap debt to be an important or 
very important factor and 66% of the respondents consider few covenants to be important or very 
important when deciding financing source (question 1a and 1l). Both answers indicate that 
convertibles are used as a substitute for bonds. In addition 56% consider straight bonds to be the 
highest preferred alternate to convertibles, compared to 33% for equity (question 5). While 44% 
consider delayed equity to be an important or very important factor, 67% consider the ability to 
call the convertible important or very important factor when deciding upon issuing convertibles 
(question 1d and 1e). The results give mixed support for the use of convertibles as a substitute 
for equity. Both investments and general financing were the major beneficiary of the proceeds 
for 44% of the issuances (question 7), and 55% expect to use convertibles as much or more in the 
future (question 8). Few issuers consider agency costs when issuing convertibles, 89% of the 
respondents find bondholder protection to be a less- or not important factor when issuing 
convertibles (question 1h). 
 
Market conditions are also important to the issuers. 77% consider high stock market volatility 
and low interest rates to be important or very important when considering convertibles (question 
3a and 3b). When deciding upon financial advisor 100% consider placing power to be important 
or very important, followed by good existing relations hip with 78% (question 6e and 6a). The 
results indicate that companies do not necessary issue convertibles to mitigate company specific 
costs, but might as well issue convertibles to utilize opportunities in the financing market. 
J. H. Getz (2011)          35 
 
 
 
5.2 The Security Choice Model Results 
The security-choice model examines why companies prefer to issue debt to equity. The results 
from the regression in table 8 show that the likelihood for a debt-like security increases with the 
SLACK and lnSIZE variables. The negative sign of the SLACK variable is in line with 
predominant views of available literature, and support the impact of adverse selection costs on 
companies’ financing choices decisions. In addition the debt and equity issuers have the same 
level of leverage. This increases the importance of having financial slack to handle increased 
leverage. The negative sign of the lnSIZE variable is also as expected, and indicates that larger 
companies face less asymmetric information, enabling them to issue debt.  
 
The likelihood for an equity-like security increases with the MTB, PROC, MKRET, YIELD and 
BNP variables. The MTB ratio’s positive sign indicates that companies with valuable growth 
opportunities finance their operations with equity to reduce both agency costs and financing 
costs associated with asymmetric information, as expected. This is further supported by the 
equity-like issuers’ lower dividend yield, a known characteristic for companies financing growth 
opportunities. Given that lnSIZE is negative, it is surprising to find that the PROC is positive. 
Large issuances of equity increase the adverse selection costs, and should lead to issuance of 
debt. The finding indicates that companies might not be able to issue the same amount of debt as 
equity if the company and their investment opportunities are risky.  
 
The MKRET’s positive sign indicates that companies find equity-like offerings more attractive 
following a period of high stock market returns, which corresponds with theory. The correlated 
variables YIELD and BNP are both positive, supporting the influence of information 
asymmetries on financing choices decisions. High interest rates increase the debt-related 
financing costs, and makes equity more attractive. This indicates that companies can choose to 
issue convertibles to reduce their interest payments. Positive economic prospects seeds good 
investment opportunities, reducing the uncertainty about their profitability and the equity-related 
costs.  
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Table 8. The Security Choice Model Regression Results
 
Logistic regression results from analyzing the determinants of the security choice between 28 convertible 
bonds, 102 high-yield bonds and 229 equity issuances. The dependable variable takes the value 1 for 
equity issuances, 0 for bond issuances and a value equal to the risk-neutral probability that the convertible 
debt is converted into equity for convertible bonds. EXRET is the issuer excess return over the Oslo 
Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OBX) 12 months prior to issuance. SLACK is the sum of cash and 
cash equivalents divided by total assets. LEV is long term debt divided by total assets. PROF is operating 
cash flow divided by total assets. VOL denotes the standard annual volatility of the stock return estimated 
over trading days -240 to -40 days prior to issuance. TAX is tax payable divided by total assets. MTB is 
calculated as (market capitalization of equity + total assets - book value of equity) divided by total assets. 
PROC is proceeds divided by market capitalization. MKRET is the return of the OBX 3 months prior to 
issuance. YIELD is the yield of 5-Year Norwegian Government Bonds. SIZE and lnSIZE is total assets 
and its natural logarithm. BNP is a measure for the next 12 months BNP projections, weighted based on 
number of quarters left of current year and necessary quarters of next year’s projection.  
 Regression Model 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -2.92
***
 0.38 -2.65
***
 -0.96 
EXRET -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 
SLACK -3.32
***
 -3.97
***
 -3.36
***
 -2.96
***
 
LEV -0.39 0.49 -0.23 -0.12 
PROF 0.15 0.55 0.23 0.10 
VOL 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.86 
TAX -0.17 1.29 -0.20 0.02 
MTB 0.48
***
 0.35
**
 0.46
***
 0.49
***
 
PROC 3.64
***
 3.03
***
 3.46
***
 3.60
***
 
MKRET 2.00
**
 2.34
**
 2.15
**
 1.99
**
 
YIELD 69.32
***
 65.35
***
 66.09
***
  
lnSIZE  -0.36
***
   
SIZE   -0.00  
BNP    0.23
*
 
Pseudo R
2 
0.15 0.18 0.16 0.13 
Log likelihood -181.07 -176.47 -180.36 -186.22 
Likelihood ratio  0.010 0.492 1.000 
Prob>chi2 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.012 
AIC 382.14 374.94 382.72 392.44 
*** 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level
 
** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level
 
* 
indicates significance at the 0.1 level  
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When I compare my findings to Lewis et al. (1999) and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) I 
find SLACK to be of greater importance in security choices in Norway than both US and 
Western Europe. Another difference is the PROC’s positive sign. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht 
(2009) found a negative sign, but no significance, while Lewis et al. (1999) found a significant 
negative sign. The results indicate that it is harder for companies to enter the bond market in 
Norway, because they need available cash on the balance sheets and are not able to issue large 
amounts with bonds. lnSIZE is significantly negative in all markets, underlining size’s ability to 
reduce asymmetric information.   
 
When I include the lnSIZE variable the MTB variable’s significance decreases from a 0.01 level 
to a 0.05 level. This indicates that the size of the company can adjust for some of the uncertainty 
associated with growth opportunities, and allow for a more debt-like security. The significance 
of the MKRET variable also increases from a 0.1 level to a 0.05 level when lnSIZE is included. 
According to theory size reduces asymmetric information; it is therefore surprising to find 
increased significance of the MKRET variable, which also reduces asymmetric information.  
 
When I test for specification errors, the results indicate that I have chosen meaningful predictors, 
but also that there exist specification errors in the logistic regressions. However, this can be 
mitigated with high pseudoR
2
. The regression model’s pseudo R2 is in line with Lewis et al. 
(1999), but beneath Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009). In addition the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s tests (goodness-of-fit test), gives low p-values as seen in the line prob>chi2. 
Models with good fit should achieve high p-values. Overall I find some weaknesses in the 
model. When I include lnSIZE the model fit is significantly improved, but that is not the case 
when I include SIZE and BNP.  
 
5.3 Convertible Bonds as a Substitute For Bonds 
This section evaluates the financing choice between convertible bonds and bonds within the 
debt-like security group. The logit regression shows that the LEV, PROF, VOL, TAX and MTB 
variables increase the likelihood for convertibles, while the SLACK variable increases the 
likelihood for bonds.  
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Table 9. The Debt-Like Security Group Regression Results 
Logistic regression results from analyzing the determinants of the security choice between 21 debt-like 
convertible bonds and 102 high-yield bonds. The dependable variable takes the value 1 for debt-like 
convertible bond issuances and 0 for bond issuances. EXRET is the issuer excess return over the Oslo 
Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OBX) 12 months prior to issuance. SLACK is the sum of cash and 
cash equivalents divided by total assets. LEV is long term debt divided by total assets. PROF is operating 
cash flow divided by total assets. TAX is tax payable divided by total assets. MTB is calculated as 
(market capitalization of equity + total assets - book value of equity) divided by total assets. PROC is 
proceeds divided by market capitalization. MKRET is the return of the OBX 3 months prior to issuance. 
YIELD is the yield of 5-Year Norwegian Government Bonds. SIZE and lnSIZE is total assets and its 
natural logarithm. BNP is a measure for the next 12 months BNP projections, weighted based on number 
of quarters left of current year and necessary quarters of next year’s projection.  
 Regression Model 
Independent Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -7.68
**
 -9.06
**
 -8.00
**
 -5.88
***
 
EXRET 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.06 
SLACK -24.10
***
 -23.36
**
 -23.52
***
 -24.48
***
 
LEV 4.96
*
 4.63
*
 4.41 4.49
*
 
PROF 6.80
*
 6.64
**
 6.79
**
 6.23
**
 
VOL 4.57
**
 5.66
**
 4.74
**
 4.48
**
 
TAX 46.18
**
 44.59
**
 45.32
**
 42.45
**
 
MTB 2.00
***
 1.92
***
 1.92
***
 2.10
***
 
PROC -2.23 -1.54 -1.43 -2.93 
MKRET 2.08 1.91 1.56 1.85 
YIELD 51.78 54.89 57.36  
lnSIZE  0.15   
SIZE   0.00  
BNP    0.11 
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.43 
Log likelihood -31.52 -31.40 -31.15 -31.87 
Likelihood ratio  0.887 0.691 1.000 
Prob>chi2 0.130 0.158 0.119 0.210 
AIC 83.04 84.80 84.30 83.74 
*** 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level
 
** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level
 
* 
indicates significance at the 0.1 level 
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The significance of the MTB variable confirms that risk is an important aspect when deciding 
financing source. The positive sign of the MTB variable indicates that the convertible issuers 
have more valuable investment opportunities at hand. Volatility is an indicator of risk and 
uncertainty, and the VOL variable’s significance shows that companies financing decision is also 
affected by this. The positive significance of the PROF variable reduces some uncertainty and 
contradicts the other variables. However, achieved profitability is not necessary easy transferred 
to new investment opportunities. Overall the discussed variables make it easier to expropriate the 
assets of bondholders, increasing the probability of asset substitution. On the other hand, the 
survey gives contradicting results with 66% considering reduction of agency costs to be of little 
or no interest. With the market-to-book ratio indicating convertible issuers have growth 
opportunities at hand, I would expect the dividend yield to be lower than debt issuers to 
underline this indication. However, I find the dividend yield to be alike. According to the agency 
cost theory the riskiness of the company’s investment opportunities is the central aspect affecting 
companies’ financing choices decision. Investors fear management with risky investment 
opportunities at hand will issue securities that enhance their values at the investors’ expense. As 
previously discussed the MTB and the VOL variables are indications of risk, and even though 
the profitability increase the probability of convertible issuers, I find enough support to confirm 
the view that companies issue convertibles to control for asset substitution under the agency cost 
theory. 
 
The significance of the SLACK variable indicates that the financing choice is affected by the 
company’s ability to take on and handle new debt, as literature states. The convertible issuers 
have less cash available, making them potentially less able to handle new debt and thereof more 
risky. Risk increases with volatility, and I find the convertible issuers to have higher volatility 
than bond issuers. According to theory this is an important aspect of the convertible, because the 
value of the option increases with volatility, reducing the necessary coupon rate to be paid. 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) both assess that riskiness of the 
issuer is the key consideration when discussing the issuers’ motivates for issuing convertibles. 
My findings indicate that the convertible issuers can be classified as risky companies, based on 
their market-to-book ratio, cash available and volatility. A company’s volatility is among others 
affected by the stock market’s volatility, and the issuers should be expected to take the stock 
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market volatility into consideration. The results from the survey also indicate that the issuers are 
influenced by the stock market volatility. I find my results to support Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) under the asymmetric information theory.  
 
I find a positive sign for the TAX variable, indicating that the convertible issuers pay more taxes 
than the bond issuers. A rational for companies to issue convertibles could be less tax 
deductibility opportunities. The convertibles’ lower coupon rate increases the amount of debt the 
company could issue without reducing the tax deductibility benefits. My findings reject this 
rationale.  
 
I do not find the equity related variables PROC and EXRET to be significant in my regression 
results. However, the descriptive statistics show that the convertibles issuances are larger divided 
by market capitalization than the debt issuances. The convertible issuances’ larger size when 
divided by market capitalization increases the adverse selection costs according to theory, and 
reduces the attractiveness of an equity issue. At the same time the stock runup is the same for the 
convertibles issuers and the bonds issuers, increasing the adverse selection costs associated with 
an equity issue. My findings indicate that companies face high equity-related costs, without 
giving them strong consideration when deciding between convertibles and bonds.    
 
When I compare my findings to Lewis et al. (1999) and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009) i 
find the same risk characteristic of the convertible issuers as they did. However, both found the 
size of the issuers to be significantly negative variable, while size is not a significant variable in 
my results. This can be related to my sample of non-investment grade rated companies, which 
will be smaller by size than investment-grade rated companies. While the size of the convertible 
issuers in the US market is approximately USD 1.0bn, the size of the issuers in Western Europe 
and Norway is approximately USD 6.0bn and USD 2.6bn
8
 respectively. Size is important in the 
debt market, and the size of the Norwegian issuers indicates they can operate in a more debt-like 
market. In addition, both Lewis et al. and Van de Gucht found EXRET to be a significant 
variable when deciding financing source, indicating companies choose convertibles after excess 
return. I did not find the variable to be significant, but the result from the survey indicates it is 
                                                          
8
 Used FX of 5.5 NOK/USD 
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important in Norway as well. 66% of the respondents considered a high current stock price that 
locked in a favourable premium to be very important or important when deciding to issue 
convertibles.  
 
As seen in the security choice model, the significance of the MTB variable decreases from a 0.05 
level to a 0.1 level when I include the lnSIZE and the SIZE variables in the debt-like security 
group. Again, this indicates that the size of the company can adjust for some of the uncertainty 
associated with growth opportunities, and allow for a more debt-like security. 
 
Again, the results indicate that I have chosen meaningful predictors, but with specification errors 
present when I test for specification errors in the logistic regressions. The regression model’s 
pseudo R
2
 is higher than Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009). In addition the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s tests (goodness-of-fit test) gives low p-values as seen in the line prob>chi2. 
However, the p-values are higher than for the security choice model. Overall I find some 
weaknesses in the model. The model fit is not improved when I include lnSIZE, SIZE and BNP.  
 
5.4 Convertible Bonds as a Substitute for Equity 
This section evaluates the financing choice between convertible bonds and equity within the 
equity-like security group. The logit regression shows that the LEV variable increases the 
likelihood for equity, while lnSIZE increase the likelihood for convertibles.  
 
The asymmetric information increases for the equity issuers with the lnSIZE variable, indicating 
that companies facing asymmetric information issue equity in Norway. In addition the LEV 
variable indicates that leveraged companies choose to issue equity. Stein’s (1992) backdoor 
equity theory states that companies will choose convertibles as financing source if the companies 
are facing high information asymmetries and high financial distress costs. My findings reject the 
backdoor equity theory in the Norwegian convertible bond market. Lewis et al. (1999) found 
support for the delayed equity theory, while it is rejected by both Dutordoir and Van de Gucht 
(2009) and me. This can be seen in light of the equity-like convertibles in the US market, and the 
debt-like convertibles in the Western European and the Norwegian market categorized by the 
dependable variable.  
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Table 10. The Equity-Like Security Group Regression Results. 
Logistic regression results from analyzing the determinants of the security choice between 7 equity-like 
convertible bonds and 229 equity issuances. The dependable variable takes the value 1 for equity 
issuances and 0 for equity-like convertible bond issuances. EXRET is the issuer excess return over the 
Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OBX) 12 months prior to issuance. SLACK is the sum of cash 
and cash equivalents divided by total assets. LEV is long term debt divided by total assets. PROF is 
operating cash flow divided by total assets. TAX is tax payable divided by total assets. MTB is calculated 
as (market capitalization of equity + total assets – book value of equity) divided by total assets. PROC is 
proceeds divided by market capitalization. MKRET is the return of the OBX 3 months prior to issuance. 
YIELD is the yield of 5-Year Norwegian Government Bonds. SIZE and lnSIZE is total assets and its 
natural logarithm. BNP is a measure for the next 12 months BNP projections, weighted based on number 
of quarters left of current year and necessary quarters of next year’s projection.     
 Regression Model 
Independent Variable (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept 0.22 5.40 0.58 -0.69 
EXRET 0.66 0.61 0.65 0.70 
SLACK 0.29 -0.70 0.32 0.41 
LEV 5.36
*
 9.39
**
 7.10
**
 5.42
*
 
PROF 1.06 2.15 1.41 0.95 
VOL 2.57 3.27 2.68 3.59 
TAX 1.29 2.95 2.10 0.43 
MTB 0.38 0.24 0.38 0.33 
PROC 1.83 1.75 1.80 2.09 
MKRET 0.79 0.89 0.85 0.92 
YIELD -1.55 -2.87 -9.87  
lnSIZE  -0.72
*
   
SIZE   0.00  
BNP    0.22 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.15 
Log likelihood -27.08 -25.56 -26.21 -26.92 
Likelihood ratio  0.219 0.419 0.861 
Prob>chi2 0.858 0.963 0.700 0.496 
AIC 74.16 73.12 74.42 73.84 
*** 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level
 
**  
indicates significance at the 0.05 level
 
*   
indicates significance at the 0.1 level  
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The specification error test results indicate that the model does not have meaningful predictors, 
leaving no specification errors in the logistic regressions. The regression model’s pseudo R2 is 
also lower than Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2009). The high p-values from the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s tests (goodness-of-fit test) are not meaningful due to the misfit of the model. 
Overall the model’s poor fit might also be affected by the low number of equity-like 
convertibles. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
According to Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) asymmetric 
information makes convertible the preferred financing source for risky companies. The security 
choice model supports this view, showing that risky companies will choose a more equity-like 
security. In the debt-like security group I find the same results. The convertibles issuers tend to 
be riskier with high uncertainty regarding the value of the investment opportunities. It seems 
convertibles are a debt-play in Norway, where companies issue convertibles instead of bonds 
because they are too risky. In addition the companies will benefit from lower coupon because 
they have investment opportunities to finance. The survey reveals some management 
considerations that support the use of convertibles as a substitute for bonds, but do not reject the 
use of convertibles as a substitute for equity. 66% of the respondents considered convertibles as 
cheap debt to be an important or very important factor affecting their choice (question 1a), 
whereas delayed equity only received 44% (question 1d). In addition the respondents considered 
straight debt to be the main alternative to convertibles (question 5), just like in Billingsley and 
Smith (1996) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004). 
 
Both the security choice model and the debt-like security group results showed that growth 
companies will choose equity-like securities. It is therefore surprising to see that the backdoor-
equity theory by Stein (1992) is not supported in the equity-like security group. Leverage and 
asymmetric information will lead to equity offerings, indicating that the equity issuers do not 
have access to the convertible bond market. The convertibles’ debt-like nature underlines my 
findings, and reveals a possible explanation for the rejection of the theory. The convertibles are 
designed in a way that leaves the probability of conversion low, disabling the companies from 
substitute convertibles for equity. Based on the similarity to the Western European convertibles, 
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I can only assume that the design of the convertibles is demand driven in Norway as well. The 
survey, on the other hand, shows that delayed, forced conversion is a consideration. 66% 
consider the ability to force conversion very important or important when considering 
convertibles (question 1e).  
 
Figure 2 shows how the amount of - and percentage of - high-yield bonds has increased while the 
amount of investment-grade rated bonds have remained close to constant over the last decade. 
According to Holba (2006) the amount of high-yield bonds increased due to increased demand 
for investments with high return in a low interest rate environment in 2004-2005. This shows that 
increased demand can affect the investors’ investment criteria. A similar increase in demand for 
convertibles could reduce the investors’ criteria and open up the Norwegian market for more 
convertibles. The current situation might make it possible for suitable issuers of convertible 
bonds to time the market and issue convertibles not necessary because they intended to, but 
because they can achieve favourable funding terms. The indication of market timing is further 
increased by the existence of companies able to issue high-yield bonds at an affordable coupon 
rate who choose to issue convertibles. Seadrill Ltd. issued a high-yield bond of NOK 2.0bn with 
a moderate coupon rate of 6.5% (approximately 3 months NIBOR plus 385bp) 05.10.2010, and 
followed up with a convertible bond of NOK 3.8bn with coupon rate of 3.4% (approximately 3 
months NIBOR plus 79 basis points) on 27.10.2009. Norwegian investment bankers I have 
spoken to also argue that issuers consider market timing and utilization of financing sources, 
theoretical concepts not evaluated thoroughly in current convertible bond research to my 
knowledge.   
 
5.6 Opportunities for Future Research 
My findings show that equity is issued by small, risky companies who issue large amount of 
capital when divided by market capitalization. To a certain extent this contradicts theory. I also 
find indications for a demand driven convertible market in Norway. It could be interesting to 
investigate further why the risky companies issue equity, and not convertibles. The necessary 
research could be conducting through interviews or qualitative surveys among investors in the 
Norwegian market. 
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I argue that both bonds and convertible bonds are fast financing sources, enabling companies to 
raise large amount of capital faster than with bank debt or equity. Management who find their 
company to perform poorer than expected next quarter will achieve better financing terms if they 
raise capital ahead of the quarterly presentation. It could be interesting to research further if 
companies that issue bonds or convertibles simply time the market and raise capital on 
favourable terms while they can. The hard part of this research would be to find numbers to 
benchmark the quarterly results pre issuance against. It could also be interesting to investigate if 
the fast convertibles’ speed enables companies to utilize windows of opportunity to get 
favourable financing terms due to high demand.  
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6. Conclusion 
I find the security choice between convertible bonds and bonds to be affected by both company 
specific and market specific factors. Valuable future investment opportunities are a central aspect 
characterizing the convertible issuers, and they are also less able to handle new debt measured by 
amount of financial slack. The risk is further underlined by the importance of volatility and 
leverage. However, they pay more in tax and do not use convertibles to utilize tax shields better. 
Outside the company the recent market performance and current interest rate environment are 
factors affecting the choice between a debt-like and equity-like security.  
 
This paper argues that non-investment grade rated companies in the Norwegian market use 
convertible bonds as a substitute for bonds to mitigate agency costs and mitigate debt-related 
financing costs under the asymmetric information theory. The companies have valuable 
investment opportunities at hand, but the companies are associated with high risk and 
uncertainty. I find no indications that companies issue convertibles instead of bonds to get 
delayed equity. The trend line from the survey is that companies use convertibles as a debt 
instrument, but not to mitigate agency costs, and that they are affected by market conditions as 
well. The issuers’ motive is reflected in the debt-like structure of the convertible bonds, with 
little probability of conversion to equity. These findings are in line with Dutordoir and Van de 
Gucht’s (2009) findings in the Western European market, but differ from Lewis et al.’s (1999) 
findings in the US market. Hence I deduce that the Norwegian market is more similar to the 
Western European market.  
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Appendix B. The Dependable Variable’s Empirical Probability Distribution  
Empirical distribution of the probability of conversion at issuance for convertible debt issues over the 
period 2005 to 11.02.2011. 
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